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Abstract
Those who believe education should involve more than learning facts 
often stress either (a) development or (b) thinking skills. A focus on 
development as a goal of education typically entails a conception of 
knowledge as organismic, holistic, and internally generated. In con-
trast, thinking skills programs commonly assume a mechanistic, re-
ductionist perspective in which good thinking consists of some finite 
number of directly teachable skills. A conception of rationality as a 
goal of education is proposed that incorporates the complementary 
strengths and avoids the limitations of the developmental and think-
ing skills approaches. Rationality is defined as the self-reflective, in-
tentional, and appropriate coordination and use of genuine reasons 
in generating and justifying beliefs and behavior. Philosophically, 
rationality is a justifiable goal of education, not only because it is a 
means to worthwhile ends but because it is an important end in it-
self and because it can be promoted via non-indoctrinative means. A 
psychological account of progressive rationality is provided that pos-
tulates continuing multiple interactions of (a) domain-specific devel-
opmental stages, (b) the learning of specific thinking skills, and (c) 
content-specific knowledge. Suggestions are made for fostering ratio-
nality at various educational levels. Finally, it is argued that the pro-
posed conception of rationality as a goal of education complements 
and clarifies a variety of other educational goals.
Keywords: critical thinking, development, education, rationality, 
thinking skills 
Introduction 
Everyone agrees that education should involve more than the rote 
learning of facts. There is no consensus, however, about just what the ma-
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jor goals of education should be. There is even less agreement about how 
to formulate, articulate, and pursue these goals (Cole, 1990). 
In the next two sections of this paper I will present and analyze two 
important current approaches to education. The first of these proposes 
that education should aim, at least in part, at fostering students’ devel-
opment. The other focuses on the inculcation of thinking skills. Although 
each of these approaches has given rise to a number of specific programs, 
I will not describe these programs or summarize evaluations of them. 
Rather, my aim is to provide a general overview of the two global ap-
proaches, with a focus on the strengths and limitations of each and the 
complementary nature of these strengths and limitations. I will then pro-
pose an alternative view of rationality as a goal of education that, I will 
argue, (a) preserves most of the strengths and avoids many of the weak-
nesses of the developmental and thinking skills approaches, (b) has a 
clear philosophical justification and psychological basis, and (c) convinc-
ingly addresses a variety of difficult educational issues. 
Development as a Goal of Education 
Most teachers would probably agree that they are interested in their 
students’ development and that development is a proper and important 
goal of education. Some see development as the primary aim of education 
(Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972), and some educational programs are explic-
itly developmental (Black, 1989). For present purposes, I will define a de-
velopmental program as one that sees development as a relatively global, 
long-term, internally generated process and that attempts to facilitate 
that process. This would include, for example, Piagetian programs aimed 
at facilitating cognitive development (e.g., Schwebel and Raph, 1973) and 
Kohlbergian moral education programs (e.g., Reimer et al., 1983). 
Just to be clear about the focus here, it may be helpful to rule out some 
other sorts of educational approaches or programs that often are labeled 
developmental. First, most educational approaches stress the importance 
of adapting instruction to the learner’s current level of understanding. If 
the learner’s current level is construed in developmental terms (e.g., the 
learner is concrete operational), such an approach is using knowledge of 
development. Such an approach would not be developmental in the pres-
ent sense, however, unless it is intended to further development (e.g., to 
formal operations). Second, some educational programs stress attention 
not just to learning and cognition but to the whole individual, including 
social, emotional, and personality factors. Such an approach is not devel-
opmental, however, unless it is intended to foster long-term development 
in these other realms. Finally, the term “developmental” is often used to 
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refer to remedial programs. But although it is possible to take a develop-
mental approach to remediation of deficiencies, remediation is not per se 
developmental. 
General Characteristics of a Developmental Approach 
Developmental approaches to education share at least two major char-
acteristics: (a) an organismic conception of knowledge and thinking, and 
(b) a view of change as primarily due to or directed by endogenous fac-
tors. I will discuss each of these characteristics in turn. 
Organismic Worldview 
Developmentalists generally see knowledge and thinking in biolog-
ical terms—that is, as living, growing structures. These structures have 
important systemic properties and cannot be reduced to the specific facts 
and skills included within them. Thus, for example, any addition of one 
number to another can be reversed through the corresponding subtrac-
tion (e.g., 4 + 2 = 6; 6 – 2 = 4). This is not a property of any particular 
number in isolation, nor of the operation of addition alone, nor of the op-
eration of subtraction alone. Rather it is a property of the overall struc-
ture of elementary arithmetic. The developmental educator would insist 
that such understanding is fundamental and that it cannot meaningfully 
be taught as a specific fact. Rather, it must grow out of an increasingly 
structured understanding of mathematics. The focus, then, is on rela-
tively general, long-term changes in cognition. 
Endogenous Basis for Change 
Moreover, the developmentalist would argue that meaningful 
knowledge and generalizable skills are produced via internal processes 
rather than being taken in from the environment. The many versions of 
this view can be classified roughly into two general categories: (a) na-
tivist or maturational, and (b) constructivist. Nativist views stress the 
hereditary basis for knowledge. Although an extended process of matu-
ration in an appropriate environmental context may be necessary, such 
maturation is strongly guided by a preexisting genetic program (e.g., 
Chomsky, 1980; Keil, 1981). Constructivist views are similar in their 
emphasis on internal guidance of development but deemphasize or 
deny genetic determination and stress instead the active construction of 
knowledge by the individual (e.g., Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget, 1983, 1985). 
The environment may facilitate or hinder such construction but the ba-
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sis for and guidance of change is primarily internal. Most developmen-
tal educators of the past several decades take a constructivist rather 
than a nativist or maturational view. 
Analysis and Critique of Developmental Approaches 
Developmental approaches to education have several important 
strengths that may account for their substantial influence. One is the rec-
ognition of structural considerations in knowledge and change. It is now 
widely agreed that knowledge and ability are not a collection of facts 
and skills but rather reflect complex, integrated, and changing struc-
tures. Moreover, there is increasing recognition that structural changes 
cannot be understood without attention to a variety of internal self-reg-
ulatory forces (Klahr, 1984). Finally, a number of specific developmen-
tal theories have been proposed that can serve as a basis for developmen-
tal programs in education (e.g., Campbell and Bickhard, 1986; Case, 1985; 
Fischer, 1980; Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget, 1985). 
One issue for any developmental approach to education is specifying 
the stages through which children are intended to progress or the nature 
of what they are supposed to achieve. The multiplicity of developmen-
tal theories provides an opportunity for the educator to choose a the-
ory that suits his or her conception of development and/or goals for ed-
ucation. But this also creates a problem with respect to justifying such 
choices. Piaget’s theory, for example, has been extensively criticized on 
the grounds that it is vague in its characterizations of the various stages 
and transition processes, that to the extent that its claims can be ascer-
tained they are substantially inconsistent with available evidence, and 
that even to the extent that the stages are clear and empirically adequate 
they focus too narrowly on logic and fail to provide a comprehensive pic-
ture of development (Campbell and Bickhard, 1986; Case, 1985; Flavell, 
1985; Gelman and Baillargeon, 1983; Sternberg, 1984). The proliferation of 
neo-Piagetian and post-Piagetian theories over the past two decades at-
tests to the fact that there exists no definitive general model of human de-
velopment that can serve as a firm basis for education. 
Moreover, even given a clear, empirically supported, and comprehen-
sive developmental theory, it would not immediately follow that educa-
tors are justified in promoting progress toward the higher stages of that 
theory. It is logically possible that human beings naturally change in the 
direction of inappropriate processes of reasoning, irrationally fixed ideas, 
or an immoral focus on self-interest, and that education should be aimed 
at hindering or stopping this natural process. What is natural is not neces-
sarily good; to justify an educational approach requires more than show-
ing that it facilitates certain natural tendencies. 
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Finally, although the developmental perspective is a useful corrective 
to the empiricist assumption that students are blank slates on which edu-
cators write, it may be an overcorrective. The environment may play a far 
greater role in development than maturational or constructivist theories 
generally acknowledge (Elbers, in press; Flavell, 1985; Rogoff, 1990). Cer-
tainly educators need to be seriously attentive to the potential of the edu-
cational environment to generate (not merely facilitate) important change. 
It may be possible to overcome some of these problems by focusing on ra-
tionality. To the extent that later stages in a developmental sequence are 
demonstrably more rational, they may justifiably be seen as higher—not 
just later—stages, and there is a stronger basis for promoting them. It may 
even be useful to specifically formulate stages of rationality that are pur-
posely narrower than general stages of development, an approach I will 
pursue later in this article. Another possibility, however, is not to worry 
about stages or development at all but rather to focus on the direct trans-
mission of specific thinking skills, an approach to which we now turn. 
Thinking Skills as a Goal of Education 
A wide variety of educational approaches and programs are aimed at 
producing good thinkers through activities aimed at the improvement 
of thinking. The programs and approaches addressed in this section are 
those that define thinking in terms of specific skills and attempt to foster 
good thinking not by facilitating some underlying developmental pro-
cess but rather through relatively direct inculcation (Adams, 1989; Baron, 
1985; Baron and Sternberg, 1987; Beyer, 1990; Blair and Johnson, 1987; 
Chance, 1986; de Bono, 1983; Hudgins and Edelman, 1988; Miller, 1986; 
Nisbett et al., 1987; Sternberg and Martin, 1988). Those associated with 
this perspective tend to use terms such as “critical thinking,” “higher or-
der thinking skills,” or “informal logic.” 
General Characteristics of Thinking Skills Approaches 
Thinking skills programs and approaches are difficult to character-
ize in that they are highly diverse and at best connected by some ill-de-
fined “family resemblances.” Nevertheless, for present purposes, I will 
ignore the diversity and focus on the similarities. Most programs and ap-
proaches within this category differ systematically from the developmen-
tal perspective discussed earlier in that they appear to be committed to 
(a) a mechanistic conception of thinking and (b) a view of change as pri-
marily due to and directed by exogenous factors. 
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Mechanistic Worldview 
Most (although not all) thinking skills advocates appear to see the 
mind in mechanical terms, as a very sophisticated computer. Thinking is 
construed as the processing of information. Good thinking, it is assumed, 
can be understood reductionistically by dissecting it into the specific pro-
cesses or thinking skills that comprise it. 
Exogenous Basis for Change 
Just as one can program a computer to process information well, ad-
vocates of thinking skills believe one can program a mind to think well. 
By specifying the specific thinking skills that comprise good thinking, 
one can then directly teach each skill to whatever level of proficiency is 
deemed desirable. The focus, in other words, is not on indirectly facili-
tating the emergence of new cognitive structures that will enable better 
thinking (as in a developmental approach), but rather on the direct incul-
cation of specific thinking skills. It is assumed that good thinking can be 
reduced to a finite set of specifiable skills and that such skills can be di-
rectly taught. As Adams (1989, p. 27) puts it, 
The fundamental assumption motivating all curricula on thinking is 
that there exists a certain set of skills or processes that are common 
to thinking in general, regardless of person, domain, or purpose. The 
common goal of the curricula is to teach those processes .... 
Critique of the Thinking Skills Approach 
Proponents of a thinking skills approach to education have pro-
vided some admirably specific and useful lists of fundamental think-
ing skills (e.g., Ennis, 1987). Moreover, many have been unusually clear 
and thoughtful in proposing means for teaching such skills and for as-
sessing what students have learned. Although “critical thinking” has be-
come something of a buzzword in educational circles, there can be no 
doubt that the thinking skills movement, far from being a passing fad, 
is a permanent and important part of the field of education. The limita-
tions of most current work on thinking skills are closely related to these 
strengths. First, although published lists of major thinking skills cover a 
number of obviously important skills, they are generally based on formal 
logic, informal logic, and/or some intuitive taxonomy of thinking abili-
ties rather than on any general, empirically supported theory of reason-
ing. Thus, the relative importance of the various skills listed is open to 
question, as is the comprehensiveness of the entire list. 
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Moreover, the reduction of thinking to any finite set of cognitive skills 
may reflect an overly narrow view (Wassermann, 1989). Even among 
those closely associated with the critical thinking movement, there is con-
cern about basing thinking skills education on a restrictive conception 
of good thinking. Matthew Lipman, for example, discussing his “Philos-
ophy for Children” program, notes that “[i]t’s of little value to possess 
individual cognitive skills if one lacks judgment as to when such skills 
should be applied. The aim of philosophy is to develop thinkers, and that 
cannot be done by merely teaching skills” (interview by Brandt, 1988, p. 
37; see also Beyer, 1990; Lipman, 1988; Paul, 1987; Siegel, 1988; Sternberg, 
1987; Sternberg and Martin, 1988). 
Finally, the emphasis on direct teaching leads to a lack of attention to 
endogenous factors, such as relatively spontaneous maturation or active 
mental construction, that may be critical to the progress of reasoning. Even 
if direct teaching is demonstrably effective, it does not follow that only ex-
ogenous factors are worthy of consideration in educating students. 
It appears, then, that the strengths and limitations of the developmental 
and thinking skills approaches may be complementary. Perhaps an inte-
gration of the two perspectives would generate a view that usefully related 
specific thinking skills to more general mental structures and that could 
address the interaction of internal and external sources of change. On the 
other hand, given the major differences in basic assumptions underlying 
the two approaches, it should not be assumed that such an integration will 
be easy, if it is feasible at all (Moshman, 1982; Reese and Overton, 1970). 
It is not the purpose of this article to provide a general synthesis of 
these two perspectives. It does appear to me, however, that it may be 
possible to propose an approach that incorporates the strengths of both 
views and avoids some of the limitations of each. A key to this limited in-
tegration is a concept narrower than development but broader than crit-
ical thinking that in some respects gets at the essence of each. I propose 
that we consider a major goal of education to be rationality. 
The Philosophy of Rationality 
Consideration of rationality as a goal of education raises a variety of 
philosophical, psychological, and educational questions. Philosophically, 
we must clarify what we mean by rationality and justify promoting it via 
education. Psychologically, we must understand actual human rational-
ity and its development. Finally, with respect to education, we must de-
velop a plan to promote rationality in schools and consider its relation to 
other educational goals. I will address each of these matters in turn in the 
remaining three sections of this article. 
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The Nature of Rationality 
I have elsewhere defined rationality as the self-reflective, intentional, and 
appropriate coordination and use of genuine reasons in generating and justify-
ing beliefs and behavior (Moshman, 1989; Moshman and Hoover, 1989). In 
this section I will explicate that definition with emphasis on its relevance 
to education. 
Central to the definition is the idea that rationality involves an appeal 
to reasons (Rescher, 1988; Siegel, 1988; Strike, 1982a). To the extent that 
ideas or actions are arbitrary or caused by external forces, there is a lack 
of rationality. One is rational to the extent that one chooses what to be-
lieve or do and has reasons for those choices. Moreover, one’s various 
reasons are coordinated with each other in a quest for some degree of 
consistency and coherence. Thus, an educational program has failed to 
produce rationality to the extent that students have no reasons for their 
beliefs and behavior or have reasons that are mutually inconsistent. 
Furthermore, rationality includes some degree of self-reflection and 
intentionality. A student who mechanically uses certain problem-solv-
ing or inference procedures that have been drilled in is no more ratio-
nal than a computer that acts in accord with its program. Rational think-
ers purposely decide to think, know they are thinking, know why they 
are thinking, and can even reflect on the adequacy and effectiveness of 
their own thought processes. Rationality, in other words, is inherently 
metacognitive. 
In addition, it is important that one’s reasons are genuine in the sense 
that they objectively justify what they are intended to support and that 
the coordination and use of the reasons is normatively appropriate. 
Knowing, of course, is always subjective in that it takes place from, and 
reflects, a point of view. There is no denying the uncertainties that this 
creates. It does not follow, however, that all reasons and all uses of rea-
sons are equally good. Learning to identify and value good reasons, and 
to use them well, is critical to becoming more rational. 
Finally, education does not promote rationality if it merely teaches 
students how to provide post hoc rationalizations for what they would 
have believed or done anyway. Rationality means using reasons as a ba-
sis for generating new actions and ideas, as well as justifying previous 
ones. 
It should be apparent, then, that by rationality I mean something nar-
rower than development but broader than thinking skills. A focus on ra-
tionality can help us keep in mind (a) why and in what respects develop-
ment is relevant to education and (b) why we should concern ourselves 
with students’ thinking. If rationality is a justifiable goal of education, 
then we should promote students’ development at least to the extent that 
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development moves toward greater rationality and we should promote 
thinking skills at least to the extent that such skills further rationality. (I 
leave aside until the last section the question of what other goals, if any, 
education ought to have.) 
Philosophical Justification of Rationality as a Goal of Education 
I will argue in this section that rationality should be a major goal of 
education because (a) it serves as a means to positive ends, (b) it is an im-
portant end in itself, and (c) its promotion is consistent with a nonindoc-
trinative approach to education. 
Rationality as a Means to Positive Ends 
It should be clear that rationality as I have defined it is relevant to all 
aspects of life. Whatever one’s personal goals, one is more likely to at-
tain them if one has reasons for what one believes and does and regu-
larly coordinates and reflects on those reasons than if one acts arbitrarily, 
reflexively, or on the basis of unexamined and/or mutually inconsistent 
reasons. Moreover, community welfare and economic development are 
likely to be furthered if members of the community behave rationally in 
this same sense. Furthermore, democratic self-government operates best 
if citizens are capable of making rational political decisions. Promotion 
of rationality, then, serves a variety of personal, community, and govern-
mental purposes and is thus an important goal of education. 
Rationality as an End in Itself 
The rationale for promoting rationality goes deeper than its useful-
ness, however. Even if rationality could not be shown to serve any of the 
above purposes, it would still have a claim as an important focus of edu-
cation. A central assumption in our way of life is that we are all autono-
mous beings worthy of respect. If education is intended at least in part to 
transmit our values to our children and thus assure some degree of con-
tinuity from generation to generation, then education should affirm our 
commitment to personal autonomy and dignity. 
But autonomy without rationality is meaningless. Unless one can for-
mulate and act on reasons of one’s own, one cannot genuinely make a 
choice and there is at best an illusion of autonomy. Only rational beings 
are capable of autonomy and dignity in the usual senses of these words. 
Rationality is thus not simply a means to promote autonomy and dignity 
but an essential component of both (Siegel, 1988; Strike, 1982a). Thus, we 
should educate children in a way that promotes rationality not only be-
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cause this serves as a means to other ends but because such education is 
an affirmation of who we are and what we value (Rescher, 1988; Wein-
stein, 1988). 
The concept of political liberty likewise assumes rational citizens. To 
the extent that insect behavior is caused, rather than based on self-con-
scious reasons, no political arrangement could turn an anthill into a de-
mocracy. A democracy can only be composed of individuals capable of 
making autonomous political choices. Promoting the rationality of future 
voters not only may lead to better choices and thus better government (a 
means argument already made above), but affirms our commitment to 
political liberty and a democratic system. Once again, rationality is not 
only a means to other ends but a central component of our way of life 
and thus an end in itself. 
Rationality and Indoctrination 
Finally, to the extent that rationality permits students to voluntarily 
and spontaneously criticize ideas and form their own conceptions, it 
serves to liberate them intellectually. Education inevitably inculcates var-
ious ideas and values (Arons, 1983; Moshman, 1989; Strike, 1982b). An 
educational system that limits itself to inculcation, however, is morally 
suspect in that it may treat students solely as a means to further the ends 
of those who select the ideas and values to inculcate. To the extent that 
rationality is one of its goals, however, an educational system enables 
students to question for themselves and set their own intellectual course. 
The system thus avoids indoctrination in that whatever ideas and val-
ues are inculcated become starting points for rational analysis rather than 
rigid limits on reasoning (Siegel, 1988). 
But isn’t the promotion of rationality itself a sort of indoctrination? If 
by rationality we meant an unquestioning commitment to certain fixed 
patterns of reasoning, this would indeed be a serious objection. But ra-
tionality as defined above is inherently self-reflective. Rational persons 
subject their own reasons and reasoning, even their commitment to ra-
tionality itself, to critical scrutiny. The promotion of rationality, then, is 
not an indoctrinative implantation of a fixed ideology. On the contrary, 
it is a liberating influence (Siegel, 1988). In the case of American pub-
lic schools, indoctrination is a constitutional, as well as a moral, prob-
lem (West Virginia v. Barnette, 1943). Clearly, it would severely un-
dercut First Amendment freedoms of belief and expression, as well as 
the more general constitutional ideal of government by the will of the 
people, if government were to mold the beliefs of each generation via 
government-run schools (Arons, 1983; Moshman, 1989; van Geel, 1983, 
1986). To the extent that public schools promote rationality and thus 
avoid indoctrination, they promote freedoms of belief and expression, 
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and democratic political choice, rather than undermining these consti-
tutional ideals. 
The Psychology of Rationality 
If one accepts the argument that promotion of rationality should be a 
major goal of education, the next question is how this is best achieved. To 
address that question requires analysis of the psychology of rationality. 
Rationality, however, though much discussed in the psychological liter-
ature (see Baron, 1985; Cohen, 1981), has not been systematically stud-
ied by psychologists (Moshman, 1990b). Although there is extensive re-
search on human reasoning, most psychological work on rationality has 
been limited to determining whether the reasoning of children and adults 
on various tasks is consistent with logical norms. But as discussed ear-
lier with respect to definition, rationality is not simply a matter of confor-
mity to logical norms. I have therefore been preoccupied in recent years 
with developing a more meaningful psychological theory of rationality 
and its development (e.g., Moshman, 1990b; Moshman and Hoover, 1989; 
Moshman and Lukin, 1989). I present below a fragment of that theory 
and adapt it to the educational issues of concern in this article. 
The Development of Rationality 
Deductive Rationality 
A key aspect of rationality is deductive reasoning. To the extent that 
one makes proper deductive inferences from well-justified premises, 
there are strong reasons for believing in and acting upon one’s conclu-
sions. To the extent that one’s deductions are inappropriate, one’s conclu-
sions are not rationally justified. Available evidence does not support the 
view that proper deductive reasoning suddenly appears at any particular 
point in development. In fact, there is substantial evidence that preschool 
children routinely reach appropriate conclusions from various combina-
tions of premises (Braine, 1990; Braine and Rumain, 1983; Hawkins et al., 
1984; Markovits et al., 1989; Thayer & Collyer, 1978) and that even adults 
typically fail to reach appropriate conclusions for a variety of complex 
logical problems (Evans, 1982, 1983; Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972). 
The strongest evidence for developmental stages of deductive rational-
ity, in my view, is seen with respect to the criterion that genuine rational-
ity is self-reflective. Even when preschool children reach correct conclu-
sions they appear to have no sense of their conclusions as conclusions. That 
is, because they are unaware of having engaged in a process of reasoning, 
they do not grasp the critical distinction between a deduced conclusion 
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and the premises from which it was deduced. Their focus is on the content 
of the premises and conclusions, not on the relation between them. 
Beginning about age 5 or 6, however, children appear to be increas-
ingly intentional and self-reflective in reaching and evaluating conclu-
sions. This shows up, for example, in the ability to recognize the logical 
necessity of deductive conclusions (Fabricius et al., 1987; Pieraut-Le Bon-
niec, 1980; Somerville et al., 1979), to recognize and deal with undecid-
ability in cases where the premises are insufficient to reach a conclusion 
(Braine and Rumain, 1983; Scholnick and Wing, 1988), and to grasp the 
possibility of gaining knowledge through inference as opposed to direct 
observation or communication (Sodian and Wimmer, 1987). 
Although elementary-age children thus appear to be at a higher stage 
of rationality in the domain of deductive logic than preschool children, 
their reflective awareness of their own logic is still limited. Specifically, 
although their ability to distinguish logically necessary inferences from 
inferences that are merely plausible, probable, or conventional reveals 
an implicit awareness of the logical form of arguments, they do not ap-
pear to reflect explicitly on the nature and role of logical form. Beginning 
about age 11 or 12, there is evidence of movement toward a third, quali-
tatively distinct stage at which reflective awareness of logical form is suf-
ficiently explicit to distinguish the internal validity of an entire argument 
(whether the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises) from the 
external truth of specific propositions within an argument (whether a spe-
cific premise or conclusion is empirically true). Thus, for example, ado-
lescents but not younger children are likely to grasp the validity of an ar-
gument such as “If elephants are either animals or plants, and elephants 
are not animals, then elephants are plants” (Moshman and Franks, 1986). 
Stage 3 deductive rationality is also revealed in the ability to grasp the 
nature of tautologies and logical contradictions (Cummins, 1978; Osher-
son and Markman, 1975; Russell and Haworth, 1987) and to distinguish 
logic from other epistemological domains (Komatsu and Galotti, 1986). 
Although most adolescents appear capable of Stage 3 understanding 
about the nature of logic, application of this competence to actual problems 
is imperfect and continues to develop at least through adolescence (O’Brien, 
1987; Overton, 1990; Overton et al., 1987). Further reflection on the nature 
of logic may yield, in some highly educated adults, an increasingly explicit 
(Stage 4) metalogical understanding of the nature and interrelations of logi-
cal system and natural languages (Moshman, 1990a; Politzer, 1986). 
It appears, then, that evidence supports the reality of a series of quali-
tatively distinct stages in the development of deductive reasoning. In con-
struing this as a matter of emerging rationality, what is critical is not the 
reaching of correct conclusions but the increasing ability to intentionally 
and reflectively deploy and coordinate one’s deductive inference sche-
mata (Moshman, 1990a). 
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Inductive Rationality 
A similar picture can be provided for inductive reasoning. Even pre-
school children routinely make a variety of appropriate inductive infer-
ences. Very young children, however, fail to reflect on their own subjec-
tivity and thus have great difficulty distinguishing their own perceptions 
and conclusions from reality itself (Taylor and Hort, 1990). Over the 
course of development, children become increasingly able to distinguish 
their beliefs from reality, to understand the possibility of different people 
having different perspectives, interpretations, and beliefs, and to recog-
nize the need to justify beliefs (Astington et al., 1988; Clinchy and Mans-
field, 1986; Flavell, 1985, 1986; Flavell et al., 1986, 1990; Flavell et al., 1987; 
Gopnik and Astington, 1988; Pillow, 1988). This transition appears to be-
gin about age 4. By age 6 or 7 children typically have a fairly clear un-
derstanding of the various ways in which appearances can be deceiving 
and of the need to verify one’s conceptions of reality by accumulating ev-
idence, Elementary school-age children are still limited, however, in their 
level of understanding about the nature and justification of beliefs. Be-
ginning about age 11, adolescents show an increasingly explicit under-
standing of the distinction between theories and data and the relation 
between these (Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn et al., 1988), and an increasing inclina-
tion to intentionally test theories by directly seeking potentially falsify-
ing data (Moshman, 1979; O’Brien, 1987; O’Brien et al., 1986; O’Brien and 
Overton, 1980, 1982; Overton et al., 1987; Ward and Overton, 1990). Ap-
plication of Stage 3 inductive rationality remains inconsistent even in ad-
olescents and adults (Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn et al., 1988; Overton, 1990). Nev-
ertheless, it appears that at least some individuals move beyond Stage 3 
to a Stage 4 level of explicit metatheoretical awareness involving highly 
sophisticated conceptions about reality, knowledge, truth, and justifica-
tion (Broughton, 1978; Kitchener et al., 1989). 
Moral Rationality 
Finally, one can provide a similar picture for the emergence of moral 
rationality. Central to Kohlberg’s (1984) theory of moral development is a 
focus not on the content of the individual’s moral views but on the struc-
ture of his or her reasoning. The Stage 1 child understands and uses sim-
ple moral rules (e.g., “don’t hit”). Stage 2 children (typically elementary 
school-age) have a sufficient grasp of others’ perspectives and the logic of 
social reciprocity to comprehend the reason for moral rules. The Stage 3 
individual (typically an adolescent) understands the basis for reciprocity 
and consideration of other perspectives in the nature and value of human 
relationships. Individuals who reach Stage 4 (typically in late adolescence 
or early adulthood) reflect on relationships themselves from the perspec-
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tive of broader social, political, and religious systems. And individuals 
who achieve Stage 5 (rare even in adults) explicitly analyze social, polit-
ical, and/or religious systems with respect to general principles of jus-
tice. The overall progression may be considered to move in the direction 
of greater rationality in that each stage involves a conscious reflection on 
the assumptions of the previous stage and thus an appeal to and coordi-
nation of a deeper level of reasons. 
Reflective Abstraction 
What accounts for the progression from stage to stage? Each of the 
three domains of development just discussed involves a very different set 
of stages. I make no claim for cross-domain consistency. There is, how-
ever, an important consistency in the nature of the relationship between 
successive stages in each sequence. Each stage may be seen as a conscious 
reflection on the previous stage that renders the basic assumptions of that 
earlier stage explicit and thus available for a reconstruction that will bet-
ter coordinate them. This is essentially the process that Piaget has labeled 
“reflective abstraction” (see Campbell and Bickhard, 1986). Reflective ab-
straction may be construed as a very powerful form of metacognition 
that doesn’t just illuminate, monitor, or direct the execution of cognitive 
processes but actively reconstructs cognition at a higher level of abstrac-
tion or, to shift the metaphor, a deeper level of understanding. Reflective 
abstraction may be postulated as central to the development of rational-
ity in that it ensures that successive stages will not just be different from 
each other but that each will be a self-reflective reconstruction of the pre-
vious one that makes implicit assumptions explicit and thus allows a bet-
ter awareness and coordination of reasons (Moshman and Lukin, 1989). 
Learning to Be Rational: A Thinking Skills Critique 
Proponents of the teaching of thinking skills would probably level a 
variety of criticisms at the above picture. I will focus on two that I think 
are particularly apt. First, the stages postulated in each domain are vague 
about the actual reasoning processes individuals use and the actual co-
ordination of those processes. Accounts of developmental stages gener-
ally do not address the real-time processing of information at the level of 
detail one commonly sees in information-processing approaches (Stern-
berg, 1984). This does not mean developmental stage accounts are incor-
rect, but it does mean they are incomplete. 
Moreover, the focus on development as an endogenous construction 
that moves in a predictable direction suggests that the learning of specific 
thinking skills is either not possible or not important to the development 
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of rationality. But there is in fact substantial evidence that, under appro-
priate pedagogical circumstances, students can learn important think-
ing skills, maintain those skills over time, and apply them to new content 
(Lehman et al., 1988; Nisbett et al., 1987). Such learning may play a major 
role in the development of rationality. 
Both of the above criticisms of a purely stage-developmental approach 
to rationality are reasonable. But rejection of the developmental account in 
favor of an account of rationality as the learning of thinking skills would, 
in my view, be an unjustified overreaction that would raise equally seri-
ous problems of its own. For one thing, without denying that meaningful 
thinking skills can be learned, the fact remains that it is difficult to teach 
such skills in such a way that they endure and transfer to new content 
(Sternberg and Martin, 1988). A general theory of rationality must not only 
explain how meaningful teaching of thinking skills is possible but why it 
is difficult. Part of that explanation, it seems to me, would be that learning 
thinking skills is not a simple matter of imitating “observed” patterns of 
reasoning but rather involves active assimilation of instructed skills to cur-
rent reasoning and understanding, a process in which, as developmental-
ists have long insisted, the learner plays an active, constructive role. 
Moreover, given the earlier definition of rationality as the self-reflec-
tive, intentional, and appropriate coordination and use of genuine rea-
sons, the learning of thinking processes can only further rationality if (a) 
the processes learned are normatively justifiable processes that provide 
genuine reasons for accepting the conclusions to which they lead, (b) 
the student understands the nature and justification of these processes, 
and (c) the student has voluntary control over the application of the pro-
cesses. Presumably, we would not refer to a thinking process as a skill un-
less it was indeed normatively justifiable. (Committing the fallacy of af-
firming the consequent, for example, is a cognitive process but we would 
not label it a “skill.”) Developers and teachers of thinking skills curricula 
obviously do not include just any process; they identify mental processes 
that constitute good thinking. Thus, criterion a is generally met in that the 
use of thinking skills by students does provide reason to believe in the 
conclusions they reach or accept. 
But if students are merely learning to apply whatever processes their 
teachers inculcate, and especially if such applications are automatic and 
routine, then the only rationality is in the mind of the educator, who has 
reflected on the nature and appropriateness of the processes to be incul-
cated and has decided, on the basis of such reflection, to inculcate them. 
The student, far from being a rational agent, simply thinks as she or he 
has been taught to think. To the extent that criteria b and c are not met, 
the result of a thinking skills curriculum is a carefully programmed set 
of thinking processes, which, according to the earlier definition, cannot 
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qualify as genuine rationality. This does not mean thinking skills should 
not be taught, but suggests that for such instruction to promote rational-
ity it must encourage active reflection on the part of the student about the 
nature and use of the skills in question. 
Development and Thinking Skills: A Partial Integration 
It therefore appears that a comprehensive account of rationality must 
address both (1) the internal reflective processes of the mind and the re-
sulting developmental stages and (2) the ongoing learning of a variety 
of skills and strategies from the environment. Moreover, these should be 
seen as opposite poles of a continuum rather than as independent and 
sharply distinct cognitive phenomena (Elbers, in press; Rogoff, 1990). In-
ternal logical structures must be linked to the world via the use of spe-
cific skills and strategies, and learned skills and strategies must be co-
ordinated with one’s more general level of understanding via active 
assimilation. Although the learning of skills beyond one’s current level of 
development is generally difficult and somewhat superficial, such skills 
nevertheless may not only be learned but may serve as the cutting edge 
of development. Correspondingly, although a variety of skills can be di-
rectly learned, such skills only become fully meaningful through a devel-
opmental process of active reflection and reconstruction. Students thus 
become progressively more rational through a continuing interaction of 
endogenous forces, leading to increasingly integrated and abstract cogni-
tive structures, and exogenous forces, leading to an increasingly sophisti-
cated set of thinking skills (Moshman, 1990a). 
Consider, for example, the strategy of testing hypotheses by seek-
ing potentially falsifying data. A strictly developmental approach would 
note that this (Stage 3) strategy emerges over the course of adolescence 
and would argue that it cannot be directly taught. The developmental-
ist would suggest, however, that construction of the falsification strategy 
can be facilitated by providing consolidated Stage 2 inductive reasoners 
with extensive opportunity to test hypotheses, thus increasing the likeli-
hood that they will notice and reflect on the inadequacies of their Stage 
2 understanding, and thereby construct the more sophisticated Stage 3 
approach. Thus, the developmentalist would speak not of teaching and 
learning but of the facilitation of development. 
A thinking skills proponent, on the other hand, would argue for directly 
demonstrating how to seek falsifying data and would suggest that if this is 
properly done, with due attention to prerequisite skills, motivation, trans-
fer, and so forth, all students at virtually any age should adopt this strat-
egy. The focus, then, is on teaching and learning. Development, if one must 
use the term at all, is (from this perspective) simply the process of learning 
and generalizing a variety of skills over a long period of time. 
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The present integration suggests that development and learning can 
be distinguished but that neither dominates the other. The Stage 2 stu-
dent who learns to test hypotheses by seeking falsifying data will find this 
strategy in conflict with his or her natural tendency to affirm hypotheses 
by seeking confirming data. The resulting disequilibrium will lead to re-
flection on the nature and relations of theories, data, verification, and fal-
sification, ultimately resulting in a reconstructed (Stage 3) understanding. 
The learning of the falsification strategy may be seen as playing a causal 
role in initiating this process and even to some extent in directing it, but 
it is the individual’s endogenous reflection that renders falsification part 
of a general inductive rationality rather than a learned procedure. De-
velopment, then, is in some sense directed by learning (as thinking skills 
proponents would have it) but (as developmentalists would insist) is not 
simply an accumulation of what one has learned. 
The Role of Content Knowledge 
I have so far presented the developmental and thinking skills views 
as being at the opposite ends of the theoretical spectrum and have at-
tempted to integrate them. But despite their very real differences, these 
two approaches in fact share an important and controversial assump-
tion. Both assume general modes of reasoning that are applied across 
content areas. 
Prior to the 20th century, the mind was widely conceived as a sort of 
undifferentiated muscle that could be strengthened through rigorous ex-
ercise. Thus, “formal training” in Latin and other rigorous subjects was 
considered fundamental to a general strengthening of the mind (Lehman 
et al., 1988). Though early psychological research showed a lack of trans-
fer from one content area to another (see Nisbett et al., 1987), modern 
versions of the generality thesis remained dominant until well into the 
1970s. Many psychologists saw formal logic as central to good reasoning 
and there has been a steady stream of research on logical reasoning for 
most of the present century (Rips, 1990). In the psychometric tradition, 
factor analytic studies of intelligence concluded that, underlying the mul-
tiple forms of intelligence, was a general intellectual factor, which was la-
beled simply g (see Perkins and Salomon, 1(89). Within developmental 
psychology, the work of Piaget (e.g., 1983) led to a strong focus on gen-
eral stages of cognitive development. Finally, early information-process-
ing theorists focused on general problem-solving (e.g., Miller et al., 1960; 
Newell and Simon, 1972). It was, as Perkins and Salomon (1989, p. 17) 
put it, “the golden age of general heuristics.” 
But beginning in the 1970s and increasingly in the early 1980s psychol-
ogists questioned the importance of formal logic and of general abilities, 
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structures, and heuristics. Research suggested that good thinking was 
primarily a matter of expertise in the content area of concern (Chase and 
Simon, 1973; Chi, 1978; Keil, 1984; see Perkins and Salomon, 1989). Con-
cepts such as broad, universal developmental stages and general think-
ing skills were increasingly questioned (see Weinstein, 1988). 
Generality conceptions have never died, however, and in the last few 
years there are indications that the pendulum may be swinging back. It is 
frequently argued that there are indeed broad cognitive skills or compe-
tencies though these may be less consistently applied (Kuhn, 1989; Over-
ton, 1990) or different in nature (Lehman et al., 1988; Light et al., 1989; 
Nisbett et al., 1987) than was earlier believed. There may even be an 
emerging consensus that general and content-specific factors are both im-
portant and that psychologists and educators should focus not on which 
set of factors is primary’ but rather on how the two sets interact (Alexan-
der and Judy, 1988; Linn et al., 1989; Overton, 1990; Perkins and Salomon, 
1989; Schauble, 1990; Siegler, 1989; Sternberg, 1989). Moreover, the very 
distinction between “general” and “content-specific” is seriously compro-
mised by pervasive ambiguities about just what constitutes a “domain” 
of content (Ceci, 1989; Ennis, 1989). 
Even if content is not the predominant factor in reasoning, however, 
it is clearly very’ important. What are the implications of this with re-
spect to rationality? Reasoning within and on the basis of a given body 
of knowledge can only be considered rational, by the earlier definition, 
to the extent that (a) the body of knowledge is well-justified, (b) the rea-
soner has a reflective understanding of that justification, and (c) appli-
cation of the knowledge is intentional. Consider, for example, a student 
working on physics problems. To the extent the student applies mod-
ern principles of physics, she or he is indeed using a body of well-justi-
fied knowledge, thus satisfying criterion a. But rationality requires that, 
in addition, the student understand the justifiability of the knowledge 
being applied. Otherwise, as discussed earlier, there is simply a pro-
grammed application of processes that others have decided to teach. 
Thus, it is important the student understand that modern knowledge of 
physics has been produced through centuries of scientific research and 
that science is a rational social tradition that has systematic processes 
for reflective critique and revisions of belief through the intentional col-
lection and use of data. For full rationality to be granted, then, the stu-
dent must have a reflective understanding of the content-knowledge 
used that goes far beyond the specific domain of content to more general 
forms of reasoning (such as the strategy of testing hypotheses by seeking 
falsifying data). The student must understand how modern physics has 
been generated by the social tradition we call science and must under-
stand how that social tradition operates in accord with general rational 
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principles. Moreover, rational application of content-knowledge would 
be based on purposeful and appropriate judgments concerning its appli-
cability. To the extent that content-knowledge rigidifies into a fixed set 
of concepts and procedures over which the thinker has no metacogni-
tive control, it yields what Sternberg (1989, p. 118) labels “the dark side 
of expertise.” 
Reasoning and Content-Knowledge: A Further Integration 
We may thus conclude that thinking generally involves an interac-
tion of both general reasoning and content-knowledge. Moreover, it 
is not enough for a student to mindlessly apply some combination of 
general and content-specific algorithms. For thinking to be designated 
as rational the thinker must understand the nature and justification of 
both the thinking processes and the body of content-knowledge and 
must intentionally apply and integrate these in a manner that reflects 
such understanding. 
Rationality as a Goal of Education 
What are the educational implications of the philosophical and psy-
chological analyses of rationality? It is not my intention to provide a spe-
cific program or curriculum for the promotion of rationality. Existing de-
velopmental and thinking skills programs may in fact already be doing 
a good job of this without having been formulated with rationality ex-
plicitly in mind. My aim in this section is to make some very general rec-
ommendations concerning the promotion of rationality at various educa-
tional levels, to consider the place of rationality in the curriculum, and to 
consider the relation of rationality to other educational goals. 
Recommendations for Various Educational Levels 
Preschool 
The psychological evidence indicates that rationality is developing in 
very young children and suggests that it can be promoted even in the 
preschool years. Preschool children are becoming aware of their own rea-
soning and subjectivity. Rationality may be promoted at this age by en-
couraging children to state their beliefs, to describe their own behavior, 
and to provide reasons for both. The focus should be less on logical or 
moral correctness than on fostering clear articulation and a commitment 
to justification. 
Da v i D Mo s h M a n i n Ed u c a t i o n a l Ps y c h o l o g y RE v i E w  2 (1990)354
Elementary School 
Once children show a clear awareness of their reasoning and sub-
jectivity, typically by the early elementary school years, the focus can 
shift to systematic strategies for generating conclusions, verifying be-
liefs, and interacting with others. For example, this might include dis-
cussion of what can be concluded from various premises, what counts 
as evidence in favor of certain scientific theories, and why one should 
be fair to others. 
Secondary School 
As students move into adolescence, they are increasingly capable of 
more explicit reflection on the form of logical arguments, the relation of 
hypotheses and data, and the nature and role of human relationships. 
They are ready for increasingly abstract consideration of what it means 
for an argument to be valid, the logic of testing hypotheses by seeking 
falsifying data, and the nature and purpose of morality . 
Higher Education 
Finally, college and graduate education can continue the level of dis-
cussion begun at the secondary level and encourage students to pur-
sue such matters with increasing autonomy and move toward increas-
ingly explicit attention to metalogical, metaethical, and epistemological 
considerations. 
Placement in Curriculum 
Any approach to education that suggests goals beyond the teach-
ing of content must consider where in the curriculum those goals are 
to be achieved. To put the matter in dichotomous terms, should activi-
ties aimed at achieving these goals be infused throughout the curriculum 
(e.g., included in existing content- specific courses) or should the new ac-
tivities be integrated and accomplished as a package (e.g., in a specific 
new course on thinking or rationality)? Arguments for the package ap-
proach generally stress the need to assure and monitor implementation 
and the possibility of achieving transfer by specifically training for it. Ar-
guments for infusion generally stress the content-specificity of cognition 
and/or the difficulties of transfer. 
As we have seen, rationality involves a complex interaction of gen-
eral and content-specific considerations. One can thus make a case for ei-
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ther approach. The ideal, it seems to me, is a combination of both. In-
fusion has the important advantage of helping students see the rational 
considerations in various content areas; a course in rationality may help 
students see what these rational considerations have in common across 
content and thus develop a more general sense of and commitment to ra-
tionality per se. The two approaches, then, are not conflicting but comple-
mentary (Sternberg, 1987). There is reason to believe that either can be of 
some use and that neither alone is optimal. 
Relation to Societal Goals of Education 
The various goals of education can be divided, roughly, into two 
categories: those aimed most directly at the furtherance of society and 
those aimed most directly at the benefit of the student. The first cate-
gory would thus include the passing on from generation to generation 
of society’s knowledge, values, morality, and traditions. The second cat-
egory would include goals such as emotional development or the en-
hancement of creativity. Although the distinction between these two 
categories is far from sharp—social continuity is presumably good for 
individuals, and individual development is presumably good for soci-
ety— I will consider societal goals in the present section and child-ori-
ented goals in the next section. 
Inculcation of Content-Knowledge 
Is an educated individual (a) one who has substantial knowledge in 
important content areas (e.g., history, literature, science) or (b) one who is 
well-developed, a good thinker, or something of that sort? Traditionalists 
who see education as the passing on of our culture’s accumulated knowl-
edge are likely to stress the teaching of content. Those who see education 
as preparing students to live in and adapt to an unforeseeable future are 
likely to stress the promotion of optimal development, good thinking, or 
something of that sort. 
To the extent that we take rationality to be a major goal of education, 
we see the educated person as one who self-reflectively coordinates and 
uses genuine reasons. An accumulated mass of isolated historical, scien-
tific, and/or other facts is unlikely to promote rationality. But content-
knowledge need not be such an accumulated mass of facts (Cole, 1990). 
On the contrary, it may consist of structured knowledge and content-
specific modes of reasoning that society has produced via rational pro-
cesses known to and understood by the student (Perkins, 1986). To the 
extent that this is the case, content-knowledge may play a critical role in 
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helping the student reflectively generate and justify beliefs and behavior. 
General modes of reasoning and understanding may play an important 
role in rationality to the extent that they supplement, and lead students 
to reflect critically on, such content-knowledge, but they cannot fully re-
place such knowledge. Thus, with respect to rationality, content-knowl-
edge and general reasoning should be seen as complementing each other 
rather than as incompatible goals for education. 
Inculcation of Values and Morality 
Should education address issues of values and morality, and, if so, 
how? Discussions of this often assume that such issues can only be ad-
dressed by either (a) directly inculcating unshakable commitments to 
certain values and moral rules, or (b) helping students clarify whatever 
values and moral conceptions they happen to hold. The first approach 
smacks of indoctrination and is certainly inconsistent with rationality in 
that it involves a fixation of beliefs that are intended to be impervious to 
further experience and reasoning. The second approach smacks of rela-
tivism and is equally inconsistent with rationality in its implication that 
all values and moral conceptions are equally acceptable, that it is wrong 
to question people’s beliefs in this area, and that such beliefs cannot be or 
need not be justified (Strike, 1982a). Given these two unattractive alterna-
tives, one is strongly tempted to argue that schools should simply avoid 
dealing with values and morality. 
But for an educational system interested in the promotion of ratio-
nality, such avoidance itself suggests moral relativism by implying that 
values and morality lie outside the domain of rationality. An approach 
more consistent with rationality is to reject the above dichotomy. One 
can, after all, propose and model a variety of values and moral behav-
iors without compelling an irrational commitment to these. Moreover, 
one can encourage students to coordinate and reflect on their own val-
ues and moral conceptions in a way that suggests rational analysis lead-
ing to genuine change is desirable but without compelling any partic-
ular changes. By focusing students attention on moral reasoning and 
encouraging coordination of values and detection of internal incon-
sistencies, schools may help students see that there can be reasons for 
moral beliefs and behavior and reasons to change or maintain one’s val-
ues. In other words, it is possible and important for schools to highlight 
and promote moral rationality. The domain of values and morality may 
be especially sensitive (Moshman, 1989), but it is not in principle any 
different from other domains that schools routinely encompass. Its ex-
clusion from the curriculum is inconsistent with a broad view of ratio-
nality as a goal of education. 
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Inculcation of Social Traditions 
At the heart of the questions of content-knowledge, values, and mo-
rality is an even broader issue of whether the main focus of education 
should be to pass on social traditions or to criticize them. It might seem 
at first that a commitment to rationality, reasoning, critical thinking, per-
sonal development, or the like would be contrary to a view of educa-
tion as passing on existing social traditions. But the view that rationality 
and tradition are inherently at odds unnecessarily assumes that a stu-
dent must either (a) mindlessly accept all the traditions of his or her soci-
ety or (b) reflexively reject all such traditions (see Hyland, 1986). There is 
no reason to posit such a choice. What rationality requires is a reflective 
critique of social traditions. Teaching the existing traditions in consider-
able depth is obviously necessary for such a critique and must thus be 
part of any education oriented toward rationality. The outcome of such 
a reflective critique of a deeply understood tradition would depend on 
the student’s assessment of the reasons for the tradition. On the basis of 
such analysis a student might indeed utterly reject a given tradition. It is 
equally possible, however, that the student might not only accept the tra-
dition but emerge from the analysis more firmly committed to it than she 
or he would otherwise have been. 
Our social traditions and institutions have evolved over many years 
and play critical and incompletely understood roles in our society (Camp-
bell, 1975). We should not assume out of hand that social evolution is 
purely arbitrary or repressively political. There may be good reasons for 
some traditions and for the form some social institutions take (Hyland, 
1986). The present approach assumes that our various social traditions 
and institutions should be well understood and reflectively considered 
and that acceptance or rejection of each should be based on such consid-
eration by students. 
There is, moreover, a deeper reason why rationality should not be 
seen as inherently in opposition to social tradition. Rationality itself is, 
by any account, one of our oldest and most important traditions (Re-
scher, 1988; Strike, 1982a; Weinstein, 1988). Underlying our various 
moral, legal, political, and social traditions and institutions is a long-
standing conception of each individual as a rational agent, reflectively 
deciding what to think and do and accepting the responsibility for those 
decisions and actions. Far from undermining tradition, then, education 
for rationality affirms and supports one of our oldest and most basic 
traditions. 
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Relation to Child-Oriented Goals of Education 
Enhancing Emotional Development 
On the basis of a sharp distinction between cognition and emotion it 
might be argued that education should focus on cognition (knowledge 
and/or thinking) and leave the emotional realm (including, perhaps, mat-
ters of social and/or personality development) to the home and/or other 
institutions. In fact, it might even be suggested that education for ratio-
nality should involve teaching students to keep their emotions in check 
so they can perceive and reason objectively and thus understand and act 
on rational rather than emotional grounds. 
But such an analysis is not justified by the present conception of ra-
tionality. Strong emotions can, of course, interfere with rational analysis 
and response, but absence of emotion may mean absence of the motiva-
tion to be rational. The definition of rationality provided earlier does not 
construe it in any way as the absence of emotion, nor does it imply that 
strong emotion is inherently inconsistent with rationality (Moshman and 
Hoover, 1989). On the contrary, the rational being is one committed to the 
use of reasons and, in human beings at least, such commitment is likely 
to have a strong emotional dimension. However sophisticated one’s cog-
nitive potential, it is unlikely that one will intentionally seek, coordinate, 
and evaluate reasons unless one approaches a matter with a “critical atti-
tude” (Siegel, 1988, pp. 39-42). Such an attitude is at least as much a mat-
ter of emotion as a matter of cognition (Beyer, 1990; Paul, 1987). The ra-
tional person is tolerant of uncertainty, feels negatively about cognitive 
constraints and biases, and feels positively about free intellectual inquiry. 
In fact, a case can be made that for the truly rational person such epis-
temic values as truth, consistency, and objectivity become highly rein-
forcing ends in themselves, allowing us to propose the fundamental role 
of what philosophers (e.g., Paul, 1987; Siegel, 1988, p. 40) label “the ratio-
nal passions.” 
Promoting Creativity 
Finally, what about creativity? Does the constant and intentional seek-
ing of reasons preclude the “letting go” necessary for genuine creativity? 
Is there thus an inconsistency, or at least a troubling degree of interfer-
ence between rationality and creativity as goals of education? 
Once again, a misleading dichotomy is itself the problem (Bailin, 1987). 
Creativity may indeed involve a degree of loose brainstorming or a rejec-
tion of the commonplace in which rationality plays little or no role. But 
Ra t i o n a l i t y a s  a Go a l o f ED u c a t i o n 359
a person who simply spews forth a constant stream of outlandish ideas 
and reflexively disagrees with what everyone else believes is not thereby 
creative. She or he is simply bizarre and disagreeable. Genuine creativity 
involves not only the generation of new possibilities, perhaps on the ba-
sis of unorthodox assumptions, but the systematic evaluation of possibil-
ities and the reflective identification and analysis of implicit assumptions. 
Thus, rationality is not only consistent with creativity but plays a central 
role in it. 
Moreover, rationality as defined here is not simply a learned set of 
thinking skills but involves increasingly sophisticated levels of reflection 
constructed by the active mind. In other words, rationality is itself cre-
atively constructed (Moshman and Lukin, 1989). Rationality is thus both 
a product and a source of creativity, and its promotion is fully consistent 
with the educational promotion of creativity. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that rationality should be a major (though not neces-
sarily the only) goal of education. Such an approach is consistent with 
a commitment to development as a goal of education provided one fo-
cuses on aspects of development (such as the emergence of rationality) 
that can be justified as educational goals independent of their empirical 
status as typical developmental phenomena. Similarly, the rationality ap-
proach is consistent with the teaching of thinking skills provided one val-
ues thinking skills for their promotion of rationality and teaches them in 
a way consistent with this goal. Rationality can be philosophically justi-
fied as an educational goal and is well enough understood psychologi-
cally to suggest how such a goal may be furthered. Moreover, the present 
conception of rationality as a goal of education clarifies and complements 
a variety of other educational aims. 
Nevertheless, anyone who quickly and easily endorses rationality as 
an educational goal has not understood its implications. To foster ratio-
nality is not simply to promote development toward a particular stage 
or to inculcate a specific set of ideas, skills, perspectives, or propensities. 
Genuine rationality is unpredictable, open-ended, and potentially sub-
versive. To educate for rationality is to facilitate processes of reflection 
and reconstruction from which nothing—not even rationality itself—is 
secure. 
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